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Abstract 
 
We investigate the role of the transport sector in structuring the location of economic activity 
within two-region economic geography models of the footloose capital and core-periphery 
types. In our setting, competitive carriers offer transport services for shipping manufactured 
goods across regions and freight rates are determined endogenously to clear transport markets. 
Each carrier commits to the maximum capacity for a round-trip and  thus faces a simple 
logistic problem: there are costs associated with 'returning empty', and those costs increase the 
freight rates charged to manufacturing firms. Since demand for transport services depends on 
the spatial distribution of economic activity, agglomeration in one region raises freight rates to 
serve foreign markets, thus generating an additional dispersion force. We show that a more 
equal equilibrium distribution of firms prevails when freight rates are endogenously 
determined than when they are exogenous and that multiple equilibria (including partial 
agglomeration) usually coexist. 
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1 Introduction
It is fair to say that transport costs and factor mobility are the two key ingredients that set
apart the ‘new economic geography’ (henceforth, NEG) from conventional trade theory. One
might thus quite naturally expect that a detailed analysis of their determinants and economic
consequences has figured prominently on the research agenda in this field. While this is partly
true for factor mobility, transport costs have usually been a much more neglected topic. Most
NEG contributions indeed heavily rely on restrictive assumptions about transportation. Trans-
port costs are: (i) incurred in the good shipped itself (the so-called ‘iceberg’ assumption), which
may be viewed as firms providing their own in-house transportation; (ii) symmetric irrespec-
tive of the shipping direction; and (iii) completely independent of the spatial organization of
the economy (see, e.g., Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999; Ottaviano et al., 2002). From an
economic point of view the most restrictive assumption is, however, that transport costs for
goods are considered as being exogenenous parameters and not prices that are determined by
the interplay of supply and demand. Put bluntly, NEG models focus overwhelmingly on the
economic consequences of changes in an exogenous parameter whose value is completely inde-
pendent from any price mechanism. Although such a simplifying assumption is a good starting
point that has allowed to analyze more rigorously some ‘old ideas’ about spatial and regional
development, it leaves a good deal of the story unexplained. How are transport costs deter-
mined by the market? How do they react to changes in supply and demand? What are the
impacts of such changes on the spatial structure of the economy and, via feedback mechanisms,
on transport costs themselves?
Just as growth theorists in the 1980s felt uncomfortable about explaining growth by ap-
pealing to some exogenous increase in productivity (the aspect you want to explain in the first
place!), the same way spatial economists today should feel uncomfortable about explaining the
spatial structure of the economy by simple changes in an exogenous parameter. The objective
of this paper is therefore to partly open the black box of transport costs by endogenizing them
through a competitive market mechanism. In our setting, competitive carriers provide transport
services for shipping manufactured goods across regions, and freight rates (the prices for trans-
portation) are determined endogenously to clear the transport markets. Each carrier commits
to the maximum transport capacity for a round-trip and therefore faces a simple logistic prob-
lem: there are costs associated with ‘returning empty’.1 The opportunity cost of transportation
then depends on the direction of shipments. Consider, for instance, the case of a container ship
that returns partly empty to its origin harbor. This ship has a very low (in fact a zero) op-
portunity cost for transporting additional goods in that direction and the carrier is, therefore,
1The problem of the “empties” is a very old one in transportation. Classic historical examples, where
returning empty increased costs substantially, include the silk road trade betweem Asia and the West, as well
as the ‘triangular trade’ betweem the UK, Africa and the Americas in the 18th century.
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enticed to undercut the price set by any fully loaded ship. The additional per unit costs in-
curred for a partly empty return trip increase the freight rates charged to manufacturing firms
in the direction where there is excess demand for transport services. This simple mechanism
has two important consequences. First, freight rates generally become asymmetric. Second,
freight rates tend to increase where economic activity clusters into one region, thus creating
a cost wedge in serving the different markets. This observation is key since two-region NEG
models generally show that when regional asymmetries increase, firms have more incentives to
save on transport costs by locating in the larger market. However, as we will show, this finding
must be qualified in the presence of endogenous freight rates. The reason is that the larger
region is also the larger exporter of manufactured goods, so that demand for transport services
is higher there. In equilibrium, manufacturing firms in the larger region thus face higher freight
rates, which reduces their incentives to stay in that region. Put differently, competitive pricing
and logistic issues in transportation reduce agglomeration forces in the economy. It is worth
stressing that investigating such imbalances in shipping goods, and the associated impacts on
freight rates and prices, is not merely an academic exercise. Indeed, the growing imbalance of
trade in manufactured goods between the U.S. (respectively Europe) and China is becoming a
real issue for the transport sector and creates enormous logistic problems associated with the
“empties”. About 60% of the containers shipped from Asia to North America in 2005 came
back empty, and those “that did come back full were often transported at a steep discount
for lack of demand. [...] The cost of all this empty space on ships is a multibillion-dollar loss
[...] an extra cost of doing business for the shipping companies, exporters and importers. [...]
shipping companies charge an average of $1,400 to transport a 20-foot container from China
to the United States. From the United States to China, the companies charge much less: $400
or $500.”2 To match that growing imbalance, the 11 members of the Transpacific Stabilization
Agreement (TSA) recently agreed to raise their 2007-2008 freight rates from East Asia to the
U.S. west coast by $300 per 40-foot container, pointing to “continuing import volumes at U.S.
ports and a growing imbalance of cargo and equipment as reasons for the increases.”3 To sum
up, the growing imbalance of trade between the U.S. and China is is reflected in the structure
of USA-China freight rates and gives non-negligible incentives to US firms to use the empty
container ships to send their product to China.
To analyze the effects of endogenous freight rates in detail, we incorporate a competitive
transport sector into the two-region NEG model of Ottaviano et al. (2002) that embeds linear
2The figures and quotations are taken from the International Herald Tribune online edition (by T. Fuller,
January 30, 2006; http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/29/business/ships.php?page=1). It is worth pointing
out that the same phenomenon applies to air freight: “Airlines had become so eager to put something in their
cargo holds on the inbound journey to China that rates go as low as 30 to 40 cents a kilogram, compared with
$3 to $3.50 a kilogram leaving China.”
3Taken from http://www.logisticstoday.com/displayStory.asp?sNO=8200
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transport costs. Carriers supply a homogenous transport service under constant returns to
scale, which manufacturing firms have to pay for in terms of the economy’s numeraire. The as-
sumption of linear transport cost fits Hummels and Skiba’s (2004) empirical finding that rejects
iceberg, add-valorem transport costs. The assumption of a competitive transport market is not
essential to our results. Indeed, the basic logistic problem created by trade imbalances between
locations also exists in transport markets characterized by monopoly and oligopoly structures.
The assumption of perfect competition nevertheless simplifies the analysis.4 In addition this
assumption is justified by the observation that transport services in many industries are offered
by numerous small agents (think, e.g., of the trucking industry). For instance, according to
figures from the Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS),5 65% of the value added of the trans-
port sector was due to trucking, which is nowadays commonly regarded as a quite competitive
sector (at least in the wake of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which significantly deregulated
the trucking industry). Finally we make the assumption that manufacturing firms outsource
their transport services. According to BTS, transportation services in the U.S. accounted for
$313 billion, i.e. 5% of GDP, in 1992. Of those $313 billion, $192 billion were generated by
for-hire transportation. Although the in-house figure is quite substantial, it turns out that the
manufacturing sector uses the largest share of for-hire transport services.
Our key findings may be summarized as follows. First, we show that a competitive transport
sector significantly reduces the so-called ‘home market effect’ that is typically emphasized in the
NEG literature. In particular, when transport costs become sufficiently small in the footloose
capital model, exogenous freight rates lead to full agglomeration of firms in the larger region,
whereas endogenous freight rates yield dispersion of firms with no home market bias. Second, we
show in a core-periphery model that endogenous freight rates lead to multiple and different types
of stable spatial equilibria. In particular, whereas only full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium
under exogenous freight rates when physical transport costs are low, full agglomeration and
full dispersion may simultaneously be stable equilibria under endogenous freight rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as it follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and
discusses the structure of the transport sector. Section 3 develops the footloose capital model
and shows that endogenous freight rates are a strong dispersion force. Section 4 then extends
the discussion to the core-periphery model and characterizes the spatial equilibria. Section 5
concludes and points towards future research directions.
4First, a monopoly transport firm would set a structure of freight rates that is similar to the competitive
market: freight rates would be higher from locations that have largest trade and shipment volumes. Second,
Bertrand price competition yields mixed strategy equilibria in the market for transport with trade imbalances.
This structure of freight rates strongly complicates the analysis.
5See http://webbts.bts.gov/publications/transportation statistics newsletter/issue 04/entire.html
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Related literature. Despite the numerous technical difficulties associated with modeling
transportation in general, several theoretical contributions provide a more detailed analysis
of the impacts of transportation on the spatial structure of the economy than the standard
NEG models do. Davis (1998), Fujita et al. (1999) and Picard and Zeng (2005) discuss the
impacts of non-zero transport costs for agricultural goods. They show that positive transport
costs in the agricultural sector reduce the likelihood of agglomeration through factor-price
responses. Picard and Tabuchi (2003) and Behrens (2007) further show that the shape of
the transport cost function (i.e., the relationship between distance and cost) influences the
structure and the stability of spatial equilibria in continuous space. Takahashi (2006) discusses
the impacts of both government spending on infrastructure and of the choice of transport
technology on the agglomeration process. Behrens and Gaigne´ (2006) and Behrens et al. (2006)
make transport costs depend on the spatial structure of the economy by considering the presence
of transport density externalities. Finally, Behrens et al. (2007) investigate how the number of
carriers operating in the market changes the spatial distibution of economic activity and how
deregulation in the transport sector maps into consumer welfare changes.
Turning to the empirical side, economic research has provided quite detailed, but often
contrasted, evidence on the impacts of a fall in transport costs on the spatial structure of
economic activity (e.g., Combes and Lafourcade, 2005; Teixeira, 2006). To the best of our
knowledge, this literature provides no detailed analysis of the structure of the transport sector,
of its price-setting mechanisms, and of their impacts on the agglomeration of firms.
2 Basic model
Our model extends the NEG framework of Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Ottaviano and Thisse
(2004) by endogenizing freight rates. Manufacturing firms first choose their location; transport
firms then offer transport services to maximize profits and freight rates are determined to clear
the transport market; and manufacturing firms finally set profit maximizing prices and product
markets clear. We solve the model backwards starting with the product price equilibrium. We
then characterize the transport market outcomes for any given spatial distribution of firms, and
finally derive the spatial equilibrium distribution of mobile manufacturing firms.
2.1 Preferences
Consider a world with two regions labeled i = H,F . Variables associated with each region will
be subscripted accordingly. We assume that there is a mass L of consumers, a share θH of
which is located in region H . In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that H is
the larger region (1/2 ≤ θH < 1). All consumers have identical quasi-linear preferences over
a homogeneous good and a unit mass of varieties of a horizontally differentiated good. The
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sub-utility over the varieties v ∈ [0, 1] of the manufactured good is quadratic. Preferences in
region i = H,F are then given as follows:
Ui ≡ α
∫ 1
0
qi(v)dv −
β − γ
2
∫ 1
0
[qi(v)]
2dv −
γ
2
[∫ 1
0
qi(v)dv
]2
+ q0i , (1)
where qi(v) denotes the consumption of variety v; where q
0
i stands for the consumption of the
homogeneous good; and where α > 0, β > γ > 0 are preference parameters.
Each consumer is endowed with q0 > 0 units of labor, which can be transformed into q0
units of the homogeneous good using a constant returns to scale technology. We assume that
the homogeneous good can be costlessly traded between regions, which makes sure that its
price is equalized across markets. Hence, we can choose it as the nume´raire, i.e, p0i ≡ p
0 = 1.
Each agent maximizes her utility (1) subject to her budget constraint∫ 1
0
pi(v)qi(v)dv + q
0
i ≤ wi + q
0, (2)
where pi(v) stands for the consumer price of variety v in region i; and where wi is the wage.
As in Ottaviano et al. (2002), we assume that the labor endowment q0 is large enough for
agents to consume the nume´raire good in equilibrium, i.e., q0i > 0. In that case, the demands
for the varieties of the differentiated good include no income effects so that the allocation of
firms’ profits to shareholders and the location where these profits are generated are immaterial
for the market outcome.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields the following individual demands:
qi(v) = a− (b+ c)pi(v) + c
∫ 1
0
pi(v)dv,
where a, b and c are positive coefficients given by a ≡ α/β, b ≡ 1/β and c ≡ γ/[(β − γ)β].
In what follows, we assume that all manufacturig firms are symmetric and differ only by
their location. This allows us to alleviate notation by dropping the variety index v. Let pij
stand for the consumer price of a variety produced in i and sold in j. Assuming that the firm
distribution across regions is given by (nH , nF ), aggregate demand for a variety produced in
region i and consumed in region j is then given by
Qij ≡ θjLqij = θjL[a− (b+ c)pij + cPj],
where Pj ≡ njpjj + nipij denotes the price aggregate (the average price) in market j = H,F .
2.2 Technology and product prices
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that transportation is provided as a homogeneous service
and that it takes the same amount of labor to ship each variety of the manufactured good.
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However, transport services are differentiated with respect to the shipping direction. Put
otherwise, transport services from H to F and from F to H are different goods. Carriers offer
services in each direction at unit freight rates tHF (from H to F ) and tFH (from F to H) that
will be determined within competitive transport markets. Since our focus is on analyzing how
freight rates affect the spatial distribution of economic activity, we abstract from internal trade
costs by assuming that transporting the good within each region is costless (tHH = tFF = 0).
Because we assume that the transport market is perfectly competitive and that transportation
is a homogeneous good in each direction, freight rates are independent of the chosen carrier.6
Production of each variety of the manufactured good incurs a constant marginal cost and a
fixed cost f . Without loss of generality, we normalize the marginal cost to zero.7 The profit of
a manufacturing firm established in region i is given by
Πi = piiQii + (pij − tij)Qij − fri, i 6= j, (3)
where ri stands for the returns to the fixed production factor. Note that (3) consists of the
operating profits derived from local sales, the operating profits derived from distant sales (‘ex-
ports’), minus the total payment fri to the firm’s fixed production factor. This fixed factor and
its associated price can be interpreted as either entrepreneurs’ time and earnings, or as skilled
workers’ time and wages, or as capital and capital rentals. We need not make a distinction
between these interpretations for now, but we will come back to this point a bit later when
distinguishing between the footloose entrepreneur and the core-periphery versions of the model.
Since each manufacturing firm is negligible to the market, it has no impact on the price
indices Pi, on the firm distribution (nH , nF ), and on the freight rates tHF and tFH . Maximizing
profits (3) with respect to prices yields a linear system of four first-order conditions. It is readily
verified that the profit maximizing product prices and outputs in market i are given by
pii(Pi) =
1
2
a+ cPi
b+ c
and pji(Pi) = pii(Pi) +
1
2
tji, i 6= j
qii = (b+ c) pii and qji = (b+ c) (pji − tji) , i 6= j,
which depend on the price aggregates PH and PF , themselves functions of the product prices.
Solving for the fixed point, we readily obtain the equilibrium prices as follows:
p∗ii =
1
2
2a+ cnjtji
2b+ c
and p∗ji = p
∗
ii +
tji
2
, i 6= j. (4)
6See Behrens et al. (2007) for the case of imperfectly competitive carriers producing a homogeneous transport
service. Adding product differentiation in the transport sector, though relevant from an empirical point of view,
would not materially change our main results.
7Introducing a constant marginal cost m into the model is equivalent to rescaling the demand intercept
a/(b + c) to a/(b + c) −m (see Ottaviano et al., 2002). As the choice of the parameters a, b and c is free, we
can set m = 0 without loss of generality.
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If we were to assume that tHF = tFH = τ , expressions (4) would be identical to those in
Ottaviano et al. (2002). The fundamental difference between their model and ours is that we
consider that freight rates are: (i) not constant but determined by supply and demand in a
competitive market; and (ii) not symmetric in both directions. As we will show, both of these
aspects have profound impacts on the spatial distribution of firms and alter several standard
results of basic NEG models.
To make sure that trade is always feasible and bilateral, i.e., qHF > 0 and qFH > 0 for any
interregional allocation of firms, we impose the following trade feasibility condition on freight
rates:
max {tHF , tFH} <
2a
2b+ c
·
In what follows, we assume that (7) always holds.
2.3 Transportation and freight rates
As argued in the introduction, an overwhelming share of manufacturing firms do not provide
in-house transportation. Instead, they rely on for-hire transport services supplied by either
privately owned and independent carriers (e.g., maritime freight, trucking, air freight), or by
state-owned and regulated carriers (e.g., rail transportation). In the long run, many private
carriers supply transport services under constant returns to scale, the building of fleet capacity
being the most important fixed cost element for maritime freight. Regulated firms, by contrast,
mostly supply transport services under increasing returns to scale. Because the latter usually
stem from the cost of infrastructure, thereby yielding natural monopolies, many countries have
separated the infrastructure management from the provision of transport services per se. As
a result, those types of transport services are also supplied by a larger set of carriers, which
has made the market far more competitive than in the past. In what follows, we therefore
approximate the transport sector by a competitive industry.8
We start by analyzing the equilibrium of the transport sector for any given population
distribution (θH , θF ) and any given firms distribution (nH , nF ). As mentioned in the foregoing,
the freight rates in both directions are exogenously fixed at τ in Ottaviano et al. (2002). This
case will provide a benchmark against which to judge the outcome when transportation is
endogenously provided by competitive carriers.
We assume, without loss of generality, that one unit of transport service is required to ship
one unit of manufacturing output. Furthermore, transport services are provided at constant
marginal cost of τ units of the nume´raire. The demand for transport services from i to j, by a
8Note that maritime freight is clearly not a competitive sector because shipping cartels are tacitly allowed
to collude on prices. Nevertheless, it is optimal for shipping cartels to set freight rates that differ according the
direction of shipments when there exist export/import imbalances. It is this freight rate asymmetry that drives
our results about the location of economic activity.
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manufacturing firm located in i, is then simply given by Qij .
9 The total demand for transport
service in this direction can be expressed as follows:
Dij(tij) ≡ niQij =
1
2
Lθj [a+ cPj − (b+ c) tij ]ni, i 6= j. (5)
As can be seen from expression (5), the demand for transport services naturally increases as
the freight rate tij falls. It also increases when region i hosts more exporting firms (larger value
of ni) and when region j has a larger population (larger value of θj).
Each carrier provides transport services in both directions and faces a simple logistic prob-
lem: he must commit to the capacity required by the largest demand on a return trip. Put
differently, the capacity required for the return trip is that in the direction of the largest demand
for transport services. Carrier k therefore earns the following profit:
Πk ≡ tHFS
k
HF + tFHS
k
FH − 2τ max
{
SkHF , S
k
FH
}
, (6)
where SkHF and S
k
FH denote the supply of transport services from i to j and from j to i, respec-
tively; and where 2τ max
{
SkHF , S
k
FH
}
stands for the cost of a return trip that the carrier must
commit to. Note that transportation is always profitable for the carrier if max{tHF , tFH} < 2τ .
A competitive equilibrium in the transport sector is given by non-negative freight rates (tHF , tFH)
and transport services (
∑
k S
k
HF ,
∑
k S
k
FH) such that: (i) carriers supply profit-maximizing quan-
tities of transport service, taking freight rates, manufacturing prices, and the location of firms
and consumers (ni and θi) as given; (ii) all carriers earn zero profits; and (iii) demand for
transport services equals supply in each market (Dij =
∑
k S
k
ij).
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Given the profit (6), the carriers’ supply depends on the equilibrium freight rates for a
return trip. No carrier will supply any service if tHF + tFH < 2τ . All carriers will supply an
infinite amount of transport services if tHF + tFH > 2τ . Last, they will supply any amount of
transport services at tHF + tFH = 2τ . In other words, transport firms supply a non-zero and
finite quantity of transport service and earn zero profits if and only if the freight rates for a
return trip equal its cost. A competitive equilibrium in the transport sector therefore exists
in two cases (see Appendix A for technical details). In the first one, both transport markets
clear at non-zero freight rates, i.e., t∗HF > 0 and t
∗
FH > 0. Because supplies are equal in each
direction in such an equilibrium (a result that directly follows from the maximization of (6)),
demands must also be equal in each direction: SkHF = S
k
FH ⇐⇒
∑
k S
k
HF =
∑
k S
k
FH ⇐⇒
DHF (t
∗
HF ) = DFH (t
∗
FH). A competitive equilibrium with non-zero freight rates therefore
satisfies the following two conditions:
DHF (t
∗
HF ) = DFH (t
∗
FH) and t
∗
HF + t
∗
FH = 2τ .
9Alternatively, we could model transport services more explicitly as a matching process between carriers and
manufacturers. Doing so makes the analysis more involved yet does not fundamentally change the forces at
play (ships continue to return empty and freight rates are asymmetric).
10The assumption of constant returns to scale allows us to consider the transport sector as an aggregate.
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In the second case, one transport market clears at a non-zero price whereas the other market
clears at a zero price with an excess supply of transport services. Suppose that t∗HF > 0 and
that t∗FH = 0. In equilibrium, the freight rate t
∗
HF must be equal to the cost of a return
trip, i.e., t∗HF = 2τ for carriers to operate. The first market then clears when
∑
k S
k
HF =
DHF (2τ), whereas the second market has excess supply
∑
k S
k
FH ≥ DFH (0). Such a competitive
equilibrium obviously occurs if and only if DHF (2τ) > DFH (0), i.e., if demands for transport
services in the two directions become sufficiently asymmetric.11 Finally, given that the maximal
transport cost is equal to 2τ , the trade feasibility condition becomes
τ < τ trade ≡
a
2b+ c
. (7)
2.4 Factor rents and spatial equilibrium
We now turn to the location of manufacturing firms (nH , nF ) given the population distribution
(θH , θF ) and the equilibrium freight rates (t
∗
HF , t
∗
FH). Each manufacturing firm in country
i = H,F earns profits equal to
Πi = (b+ c)
[
Lθip
∗2
ii + Lθj
(
p∗ij − t
∗
ij
)2]
− fri.
In equilibrium, these profits are absorbed by the factor rents, which implies that
r∗i =
L(b+ c)
f
[
θip
∗2
ii + θj
(
p∗ij − t
∗
ij
)2]
. (8)
It is convenient to define the ‘access gain’ from producing in market i as follows:
Ri
(
t∗ji
)
≡
L(b+ c)
f
θi
[
p∗2ii −
(
p∗ji − t
∗
ji
)2]
(9)
=
L(b+ c)
f
t∗jiθi
2a− [4b+ c(2− nj)]t
∗
ji
8(2b+ c)
, i 6= j.
Then, the factor rent differential across regions is simply equal to
∆r∗ = r∗H − r
∗
F = RH (t
∗
FH)− RF (t
∗
HF ) . (10)
This factor rent differential is positive when the access gain from producing in region H exceeds
that from producing in region F . A positive factor rent differential creates an incentive for factor
owners to relocate their factors to region H , whereas a negative differential has the opposite
effect. We define a spatial equilibrium to be a distribution of firms such that: (i) product and
factor markets clear at the equilibrium prices p∗ij, t
∗
ij and r
∗
i (for i = H,F ); and (ii) no factor
can fetch a higher return by changing location. Put differently, a spatial equilibrium is a scalar
n∗H that satisfies one of the following three conditions: (i) ∆r
∗ = 0 with n∗H ∈ (0, 1); or (ii)
11This can be seen as follows (see also Appendix A):
∑
k S
k
HF = DHF (2τ ) >
∑
k S
k
FH ≥ DFH (0).
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∆r∗ ≥ 0 with n∗H = 1; or (iii) ∆r
∗ ≤ 0 with n∗H = 0. Case (i) will be referred to as an interior
equilibrium, whereas cases (ii) and (iii) will be referred to as corner equilibria (agglomerated
equilibria).
In what follows, we analyze two cases: the footloose capital model, where factor owners
are immobile capitalists (see, e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003; Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003); and the
core-periphery model, where factor owners are mobile skilled workers (see, e.g., Krugman, 1991;
Ottaviano et al., 2002).
3 Footloose capital model
New trade and economic geography models in the wake of Krugman (1980) emphasize the fact
that regional size asymmetries entice firms producing under increasing returns to scale to save
on transport costs by locating close to their larger markets. In equilibrium, large countries
host a share of firms in excess of their population share, an outcome termed the ‘home market
effect’ (henceforth, HME; see, e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985).12 We now show that the
presence of a competitive transport sector that faces logistic problems significantly qualifies
this result. The intuition is that too much agglomeration is no longer feasible since it increases
the freight rate differential across countries. Consequently, the HME gets strongly dampened
so that a more even spatial equilibrium distribution of firms prevails. To guide intuition, we
first briefly review the HME in a standard setting with exogenous and identical interregional
transport costs. We then show that manufacturing firms are enticed to agglomerate less when
freight rates are set by the market via a competitive transport sector. We finally show that the
HME may entirely disappear when transport costs τ are sufficiently small.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that the market sizes are exogenously given
by θH ≥ θF ≡ 1 − θH . The resulting model without expenditure mobility is known as the
‘footloose capital’ model. In this type of model, the fixed factor f can be interpreted as being
capital used by manufacturing firms, and ri stands for the capital rents that are repatriated to
their owners. The absence of income effects in our quasi-linear specification makes the actual
distribution of profits across agents in each country irrelevant to the market outcome. We
further assume, for simplicity, that workers in the transport sector are immobile and accounted
for in the parameters (θH ,θF ).
3.1 Exogenous and identical freight rates
This section derives the benchmark case with exogenous and identical freight rates, i.e., tHF =
tFH = τ . Put differently, it corresponds to the special case where transport costs exactly equal
12The HME need not arise when there is no costlessly tradable good (Davis, 1998). In our framework, the
HME always arises when transport costs are exogeneously given (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
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half of the marginal cost of the return trip. The manufacturing prices, as given by (4), can be
rewritten as:
p∗ii =
1
2
2a+ cnjτ
2b+ c
and p∗ji = p
∗
ii +
τ
2
, ∀i 6= j. (11)
An (interior) spatial equilibrium can be determined from the condition that factor returns be
equalized across countries, i.e.,
∆r∗ = RH(τ )− RF (τ ) =
L(b+ c)τ
f
[
θH
(
p∗HH −
τ
4
)
− θF
(
p∗FF −
τ
4
)]
= 0. (12)
Substituting the equilibrium prices (11), the foregoing expression can readily be solved to yield
n∗H =

1
2
+
(
θH −
1
2
)
4a− 2bτ
cτ
if θH ≤ θH
1 otherwise.
(13)
In the foregoing expression,
θH ≡
1
2
+
1
2
cτ
4a− 2bτ
denotes the threshold regional size above which full agglomeration of all firms into the larger
region obtains. Note that (4a− 2bτ )/(cτ) > 1 under the trade feasibility condition τ < τ trade,
which thereby establishes that θH ∈ (0, 1). The disproportionate location of industry in the
larger region can then be easily seen by reshuffling the above expression to yield
n∗H −
1
2
=
4a− 2bτ
cτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
(
θH −
1
2
)
. (14)
In words, an increase in the size of a region maps into a more than proportionate increase in the
mass of firms established there, which is precisely the HME. As shown by expression (14), the
home market effect is ‘magnified’ for lower transport costs. In particular, when τ gets close to
zero, the home market effect becomes so strong that full agglomeration occurs for any regional
size asymmetries. We can summarize those results as follows.
Proposition 1 (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004) Under exogenously given and identical freight
rates, a home market effect always arises. This effect is magnified as transport costs fall, and
firms fully agglomerate in the larger country for either small transport costs and/or large size
asymmetries.
We now relax the admittedly strong assumption that freight rates are exogeneously given
constants. As we will see, the foregoing properties are substantially modified in a setting where
freight rates are endogenously determined in a competitive market.
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3.2 Endogenous freight rates
Assume now that freight rates are determined by the market clearing conditions for trans-
portation services. We first characterize the case where freight rates are non-zero, i.e., when
interregional shipments are balanced. Assume thatDHF = DFH which, as shown in Section 2.3,
implies that t∗HF + t
∗
FH = 2τ , t
∗
HF > 0 and t
∗
FH > 0. The equilibrium freight rate is given by
t∗ij =
2[a(θi − ni)− θi(1− ni)(2b+ cni)τ ]
2b[ni(2θi − 1)− θi]− cninj
, (15)
which is feasible if and only if 0 ≤ t∗ij ≤ 2τ . One can readily verify that
lim
ni→0
t∗ij = 2τ −
a
b
< 0 and lim
ni→1
t∗ij =
a
b
> 2τ , (16)
where the inequalities derive from the trade feasibility condition 2τ < τ trade. Expressions (16)
show that configurations close to full agglomeration are never compatible with non-zero freight
rates in both directions because there is excess capacity in at least one direction that cannot be
absorbed by the market freight rates. Some cumbersome computations making use of the trade
feasibility condition show that
∂t∗ij
∂ni
> 0 and
∂t∗ij
∂θi
< 0.
As expected, the freight rate from i to j increases with the share of firms operating in region
i and with the size of region j. The intuition is that the larger region i’s share of firms or the
larger its trading partner j, the larger its share of production and exports. This results in an
imbalance between the volumes of exports and imports, thereby putting strain on carriers that
have to commit resources to return trips. The freight rates for exports from i to j thus must
rise, which reduces region i firms’ competitiveness and exports; whereas the freight rates for
imports from j to i must fall, which boosts regions j firms’ competitiveness and exports. When
the imbalance gets too large (close to full agglomeration), the freight rates from the smaller to
the larger country fall to zero, thus providing firms incentives to set up operations there.
We next analyze the impact of the transport sector on firms’ location and on the HME. To
begin with, we study the conditions under which full agglomeration may occur. When there
is agglomeration in the larger region H (1/2 ≤ θH < 1 and nH = 1), we know from (16) that
both freight rates cannot simultaneously be positive in that case. Therefore, the freight rate
for shipping from the region with the small demand for transport services falls to zero, i.e.,
t∗FH = 0 < 2τ = t
∗
HF . The incentives to locate in regions H are then equal to
∆r∗ = RH(0)− RF (2τ) = −
2τL(b+ c)(1− θ)
f
(
p∗FF −
τ
2
)
< 0.
Put differently, full agglomeration is never an equilibrium for all 1/2 ≤ θH < 1. Because full
agglomeration can never be an equilibrium under endogenous freight rates, we conclude that
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firms tend to disperse more in the presence of the transport sector and endogenous freight rates.
To see this more clearly, assume that 1/2 ≤ θH ≤ θH and fix the firm distribution to the interior
equilibrium (13) obtained under exogenous freight rates. We then ask whether firms are enticed
to disperse further if freight rates become endogenous. At an interior spatial equilibrium (13),
the access gains from producing in each region are identical: RH (τ) = RF (τ). Now observe
that
dRi
dt∗ji
=
L(b+ c)
f
θi
a− (4b+ c(1 + ni))t
∗
ji
4(2b+ c)
> 0,
where the inequality comes from the condition tji < 2τ < 2a/(2b + cni)) for all 0 ≤ ni ≤ 1.
Therefore, when t∗FH < τ < t
∗
HF , we see that RH (t
∗
FH) < RH (τ) = RF (τ) < RF (t
∗
HF ), which
implies that ∆r∗ < 0. Firms therefore unambiguously have an incentive to disperse more under
endogenous freight rates when 1/2 ≤ θH ≤ θH .
Finally, we may investigate the location equilibrium when the transport costs τ are close to
zero. In this case, because t∗HF +t
∗
FH = 2τ , both equilibrium freight rates t
∗
HF and t
∗
FH also tend
to zero. The prices are approximately given by a/(2b+ c), so that freight rates are of second-
order magnitude when compared to prices. As a result, expression (10) can be approximated
to the first order by
∆r∗ ≃
L(b+ c)a
f (2b+ c)
(θHt
∗
FH − θF t
∗
HF ) . (17)
The incentives to relocate to region H simply depend on the difference between the transport
bills θiLt
∗
ji in both directions. The reason is that since freight rates are very small when
compared to product prices, the latter ones are very similar in both markets. The factor
rent differential then stems solely from the tiny difference between the transport bill when
exporting to region H or to regions F .13 When freight rates are exogenous and identical in
each direction, the transport bill is larger for exporting to the larger region H , which entices
firms to produce in that region (to minimize transport costs). At the spatial equilibrium, firms
fully agglomerate in region H because ∆r∗ ∝ (θH − θF ) τ > 0. By contrast, when freight rates
are endogenous this logic is significantly modified. Indeed, any interior spatial equilibrium
is such that transport bills are equalized across countries: t∗FHθH = t
∗
HF θF . Asymmetries in
market sizes and, therefore, in consumption shares are fully absorbed by freight rates. Plugging
the freight rates (15) into (17), and approximating to the first order, we obtain the spatial
equilibrium condition
n∗H −
1
2
∼= θH −
1
2
.
Therefore, a rise in the population share yields a strictly proportional increase in the share of
firms. Put differently, for small enough transport costs the HME disappears in the presence of
13It is worth noting that this results explains the apparently paradoxical fact that trade costs do seem to
become more important in determining trade flows and the location of firms despite their continuing decline
since about 50 years.
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endogeneous freight rates. We can summarize our results as follows.
Proposition 2 (Home market effect and endogenous freight rates) Under endogenous
freight rates: (i) the home market effect is weaker than under exogenous freight rates; (ii) firms
never fully agglomerate in the larger region; and (iii) the HME vanishes when transport costs
are close to zero.
Unfortunately, we cannot analytically compute the spatial equilibrium by substituting prod-
uct prices and freight rates into the relocation incentives ∆r∗.14 However, we can illustrate
Proposition 2 with the help of a numerical example. Figure 1 depicts the spatial distribution
1/2 ≤ n∗H ≤ 1 of firms for transport costs τ ranging from 0 to τ
trade.15 The steeper curves on the
left-hand side depict the firm distributions under exogenous and identical freight rates, whereas
the flatter curves on the right-hand side depict the firm distributions under endogenous freight
rates. For each case, the little arrows show how the the locus of spatial distribution moves as
the transport cost τ increases. Figure 1 clearly illustrates our previous results: firms are more
dispersed when freight rates are endogeneous and the HME vanishes with lower transport costs
τ .
Insert Figure 1 about here.
A final remark is in order. Indeed, one may wonder to what extent our results are driven
by the assumption that the agricultural good can be transported at zero cost. What would
happen in a world in which ships do not return “empty” but do bring back the (numeraire)
agricultural good? First, as shown by Davis (1998) and Picard and Zeng (2005), introducing
trade costs for the agricultural good constitutes an additional dispersion force which makes
agglomeration less likely to occur. The reason is that factor price equalization no longer holds
so that agglomeration raises wages and decreases firms’ profitability in the agglomerating region.
However, allowing for empty ships to carry agricultural goods relaxes the dispersion force in our
model by narrowing the gap between the asymmetric freight rates. Yet, it is known that the bulk
carrier fleets transporting agricultural goods are significantly different from the container carrier
fleets transporting manufacturing goods. Therefore, there exist additional costs in transporting
back agricultural goods on a fleet dedicated to manufacturing goods, which creates a trade cost
wedge tHF − tFH that works against agglomeration.
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14Doing so yields a polynomial of degree 7 with respect to nH , which is impossible to analyze in detail.
15The parameter values are set as follows: a = b = c = 1 and f = .1.
16As pointed out in the China-U.S. case: “The container imbalance between China and the West was to some
extent a technical problem because China’s main imports were bulk cargo - commodities like iron, soybeans
and oil, which are not typically shipped in containers. This cargo is mismatched with China’s exports, which
are mostly manufactured goods.” (International Herald Tribune, op. cit.)
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We now turn to the core-periphery model where firms co-locate with the owners of their
production factors (Krugman, 1991; Ottaviano et al., 2002).
4 Core-periphery model
Assume, in what follows, that the population L > 1 can be divided into entrepreneurs and
workers. Entrepreneurs are the owners of the firms’ fixed factors, and they are mobile across
regions. They work in the manufacturing sector only. Workers, by contrast, are immobile and
they work in either the constant returns or the transport sector.17 Because transport firms
operate from both regions (they organize return trips), workers in the transport sector can
reside in any region. However, those workers are paid the same unit wage whichever sector
they work in. Therefore, their precise location is irrelevant to our analysis.
Following standard practice in core-periphery models, we assume that the immobile workers
are evenly distributed across the two regions. For simplicity, we also assume that each firm needs
one entrepreneur only, i.e., f = 1. Since there is a unit mass of firms, there is then also a unit
mass of entrepreneurs; the remaining A ≡ (L−1)/2 agents are immobile workers in each region.
All agents spend their income in the region they are located in. Hence, the mass of consumers
in region i = H,F is given by θiL = A + ni. Contrary to the footloose capital model, where
factors are allocated across regions based on nominal rates of returns, entrepreneurs choose their
locations in the core-periphery model based on indirect utility differentials between regions.
This indirect utility is given by Vi ≡ Si + ri (see Ottaviano et al., 2002), where
Si =
a2
2b
− a (nipii + njpji)−
c
2
(nipii + njpji)
2 +
(b+ c)
2
(
nip
2
ii + njp
2
ji
)
stands for the consumer surplus and where ri is the return to entrepreneurship (the firm’s profit,
as given by (8)).18 The relocation incentives can now be expressed as follows:
∆V ∗ = ∆S∗ +∆r∗ = S∗H − S
∗
F +R
∗
H − R
∗
F .
A spatial equilibrium is a distribution nH ∈ [0, 1] of entrepreneurs that satisfies one of the
following three conditions: (i) ∆V ∗ = 0 with nH ∈ (0, 1); or (ii) ∆V
∗ ≥ 0 with nH = 1; or (iii)
∆V ∗ ≤ 0 with nH = 0. Furthermore, an equilibrium distribution of entrepreneurs is said to
be (asymptotically) stable if any small deviation from that distribution triggers an adjustment
process that leads back to the initial equilibrium. In what follows, we consider the following
17When the marginal labor requirement in the manufacturing sector is not normalized to zero, this sector will
draw workers from the constant returns sector. The results are qualitatively the same, provided there is enough
labor so that the consumption of the numeraire remains positive for all agents.
18The notation Si, standing for the consumer surplus in region i, should not to be confused with the earlier
notation Skij which denotes the supply of transport service by carrier k and which is no longer used in the sequel.
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law of motion for entrepreneurs:
dnH
dt
=
{
∆V ∗ if nH ∈ (0, 1)
0 if nH = 0 or if nH = 1
Hence, an interior equilibrium distribution of entrepreneurs will be stable if moving to another
region decreases their utility; whereas it will be unstable if moving to another region increases
their utility.
As in the foregoing section, we first briefly review the properties of the traditional model
with identical and exogenous freight rates. We then analyze in detail the more interesting case
in which freight rates are endogeneously determined by a competitive transport market.
4.1 Exogenous and identical freight rates
In the model with exogenous and identical freight rates (tHF = tFH = τ ) the consumer surplus
differential, evaluated at the equilibrium prices (4), is given by
∆S∗ = S∗H − S
∗
F =
(b+ c)2
(2b+ c)2
(2a− τb) τ
(
nH −
1
2
)
,
whereas the factor price differential (12) can be expressed as follows (recall that f = 1):
∆r∗ = R∗H(τ)− R
∗
F (τ) =
b+ c
2(2b+ c)
Lτ
(
nH −
1
2
)
[4a− τ (2b+ Lc)] .
Some standard calculations show that
∆V ∗ = κ
(
nH −
1
2
)
τ (τ ∗ − τ)
where
τ ∗ =
4a (3b+ 2c)
6b2 + 6bc + c2 + 2Ac (2b+ c)
and where κ is a positive bundle of parameters independent of τ . The foregoing expression
reveals that nH = 1/2 is always a spatial equilibrium. Furthermore, [∂(∆V
∗)/∂nH ]nH=1/2 < 0
for all values of nH if and only if τ > τ
∗. In that case, starting from the symmetric distribution
nH = 1/2, as more entrepreneurs move to region H (nH > 1/2) their utility falls so that such
a move is not profitable. By contrast, when τ < τ ∗, as more entrepreneurs move to region H
(nH > 1/2) their utility increases, which makes such a move profitable. Since the relocation
incentives ∆V ∗ are positive for all nH > 1/2 when τ < τ
∗, full agglomeration of all mobile
entrepreneurs in region H will be the equilibrium outcome. We may summarize these results
as follows:
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Proposition 3 (Ottaviano et al., 2002) When τ > τ ∗, dispersion (n∗H = 1/2) is the only
spatial equilibrium. When τ < τ ∗, full agglomeration (n∗H = 0 or n
∗
H = 1) of all mobile
entrepreneurs into either region is the only stable equilibrium. In the special case where τ = τ ∗,
any distribution is an equilibrium.
Note that there exist sets of parameter values such that entrepreneurs fully agglomerate ir-
respective of the value of transport costs τ , (τ < τ trade). This happens when τ ∗ ≥ τ trade, a
condition known as the ‘black hole condition’.
4.2 Endogenous freight rates
We now show that, as in the footloose entrepreneur case, agglomeration patterns significantly
differ when freight rates are determined in a competitive transport market. We first analyze
and discuss the case of symmetric and fully agglomerated equilibria. As these are not the only
outcomes under endogenous freight rates, we then analyze the case of partially agglomerated
equilibria and present an example of the resulting firm distribution.
4.2.1 Stable symmetric equilibria
In what follows, let [·]nH=1/2 ≡ [·]1/2 to alleviate notation. The symmetric equilibrium is stable
if and only if [∂(∆V ∗)/∂nH ]1/2 < 0. Note that in this model the price of a variety depends
only on the number of local producers and on the freight rates of imports: p∗HH = p(nH , tFH)
and p∗FF = p(nF , tHF ). Since the access gain Ri and the consumer surplus Si, i ∈ {H,F},
depend only of the firm distribution and on the consumer prices, we can now use the definition
Ri ≡ R (ni, tji) and Si ≡ S (ni, tji). Because nF ≡ 1− nH , we have[
d∆V
dnH
]
1/2
= 2
[
dRH
dnH
]
1/2
+ 2
[
dSH
dnH
]
1/2
.
A firm’s gain from relocation is still given by (9), so that[
dRH
dnH
]
1/2
=
[
∂RH
∂θH
]
1/2
+
[
∂θH
∂nH
]
1/2
+
+
[
∂RH
∂pHH
]
1/2
+
[
∂pHH
∂nH
]
1/2
−
(18)
+

[
∂RH
∂tFH
]
1/2
+
+
[
∂RH
∂pHH
]
1/2
+
[
∂pHH
∂tFH
]
1/2
+

[
∂tFH
∂nH
]
1/2
−
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(see Appendix B for details on the signs of the derivatives). Turning to consumer surplus, it is
readily verified that[
dSH
dnH
]
1/2
=
[
∂SH
∂nH
]
1/2
+
+
[
∂SH
∂pHH
]
1/2
−
[
∂pHH
∂nH
]
1/2
−
(19)
+

[
∂SH
∂tFH
]
1/2
−
+
[
∂SH
∂pHH
]
1/2
−
[
∂pHH
∂tFH
]
1/2
+

[
∂tFH
∂nH
]
1/2
−
(see Appendix B for details on the signs of the derivatives).
Several comments are in order. First, expression (18) captures the relocation incentives
for entrepreneurs created by the returns to the fixed factor. Note that the first two terms in
(18) hold irrespective of whether freight rates are endogenous or not. The first of these terms
denotes the forward demand linkage: mobile entrepreneurs spend their income in the region
they are established in, so that their relocation to region H increases demand there, which in
turn fosters agglomeration. The second term captures the competition effect : price competition
is fiercer in the location where entrepreneurs agglomerate, which ceteris paribus entices them
to disperse in order to soften competition. The last term of (18) is specific to our framework
with endogenous freight rates. Since it is negative, it constitutes an additional dispersion force.
As we have previously seen in the footloose capital model, an increase in region H ’s industry
share increases freight rates in the direction of region F and, thereby, reduces firms’ incentives
to locate in H . At the same time, lower freight rates in the direction of region H increase the
competitive advantage of firms located in F which can now more easily serve customers in H .
Competition intensifies in H , thus reducing the locational advantage of the larger region.
Second, while changes in factor rewards partly drive location decisions in the core-periphery
model, mobile entrepreneurs also take into consideration changes in consumer surplus. Expres-
sion (19) captures these changes. The first two terms in (19) hold again irrespective of whether
freight rates are endogenous or not. They show that entrepreneurs benefit from both a larger set
of local varieties and from lower consumer prices caused by increased competition in the product
market. The last term of (19) is specific to our framework with endogenous freight rates. Since
it is positive, it constitutes an additional agglomeration force. Indeed, as more entrepreneurs
and firms agglomerate in region H the freight rates from region F to H decrease, thus putting
downward pressure on the prices of imports (and, since goods are substitutes, also on prices
of domestic goods). Put differently, when freight rates are endogenous the agglomeration of
mobile entrepreneurs into one region puts additional downward pressure on prices in the larger
region via changes in import freight rates. Whereas this is good news for entrepreneurs on the
consumption side, it is bad news on the production side. The overall impact on agglomeration
patterns is therefore a priori ambiguous and requires some more detailed investigation.
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We now compare the stability of the symmetric equilibrium under exogenous and endogenous
freight rates. Note that because the first two terms in expressions (18) and (19) are exactly
the same as under exogenous freight rates, by Proposition 3, their sum is positive if and only if
τ < τ ∗. Consequently, the agglomeration forces will be weaker under endogenous freight rates
if and only if the sum of the last terms in (18) and (19) is negative. Standard computations
show that the last terms of (18) and (19) are given by:19
−
4(b+ c)L(a− bτ )2
(2b+ c)(4b+ c)
< 0 and
(b+ c)(a− bτ )[8a(b+ c)− τ (8b2 + 8bc + c2)]
2(2b+ c)2(4b+ c)
> 0
where the second inequality holds from the trade feasibility condition. Their sum can then be
expressed as follows:
(b+ c)(a− bτ) [−8a((b+ c)(L− 1) + bL)− (c2 + 8b((b+ c)(1− L)− bL)] τ)
2(2b+ c)2(4b+ c)
(20)
As shown in Appendix C, this expression is always negative for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ trade/2. We can
therefore conclude that agglomeration forces are weaker and the stability of the symmetric
equilibrium more likely under endogenous freight rates. In particular, it is obvious that firms
will disperse under endogenous freight rates when τ = τ ∗ since the sum of the two first terms
in expressions (18) and (19) is zero, so that the negative term (20) dominates.
Although agglomeration forces are weaker when freight rates are endogenous than when
they are exogenous, agglomeration may still be possible for some values of τ < τ ∗. To check
whether and when this case may arise, we sum all the terms in (18) and (19) to obtain:[
d∆V ∗
dnH
]
1/2
∝ −Φ0 + Φ1τ − Φ2τ
2 (21)
where
Φ0 = 16a
2[c(L− 1) + b(2L− 1)] > 0
Φ1 = 2a[3c
2 + 8b2(1 + 4L) + 2bc(3 + 8L)] > 0
Φ2 = c
3L+ 2bc2(1 + 3L) + 8b3(1 + 4L) + 6b2c(1 + 4L) > 0
are three positive bundles of parameters. Hence, (21) is a concave and quadratic function of
τ , negative at τ = 0 and, by the foregoing arguments, also negative at τ ∗. We thus get the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 (stability of the symmetric equilibrium) If Φ21 < 4Φ2Φ0 the symmetric
equilibrium is stable for all values of τ ; whereas if Φ21 ≥ 4Φ2Φ0, there exist two thresholds
0 < τ 1 < τ 2 < τ
∗ such that the symmetric equilibrium is stable for [0, τ 1] and [τ 2, τ
trade).
19Recall that θH = (A+ 2nH)/(2L) = (L− 1 + 2nH)/(2L).
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Proposition 4 shows that, by contrast to the model with exogenous freight rates, symmetric
equilibria are stable for transport costs τ that are either close to zero or close to τ trade. Further-
more, there exist sets of parameters such that the symmetric equilibrium is stable for all values
of τ . Note that these results are analoguous to the ones in Puga (1999), where dispersion may
also arise for both high and low values of trade costs. However, whereas the results require
immobile labor in Puga’s (1999) model, they are driven by the engogeneity of freight rates in
our setting. Put differently, once freight rates are set by a competitive market, dispersion may
be the equilibrium outcome even in the presence of very low transport costs when industry is
a priori mobile across regions.
4.2.2 Fully agglomerated equilibria
Suppose now that firms fully agglomerate. Without loss of generality, we consider the case
where nH = 1 and nF = 0. Note first that, as shown in Section 3.2., freight rates correspond in
that case to the corner solution t∗HF = 2τ and t
∗
FH = 0. This is because an interior solution for
freight rates would yield t∗FH = 2τ−a/b, which is negative for all admissible values of τ < τ
trade.
Consequently, freight rates from H to F do no longer rise with further agglomeration of firms
in the neighborhood of full agglomeration. Put differently, once agglomeration is strong enough
transport markets no longer work to reduce agglomeration forces. Although freight rates then
become exogenous, as in Ottaviano et al. (2002), they take different values depending on the
direction of shipments. In particular, because of the absence of firms in region F , carriers return
empty to region H , so that the opportunity cost of the return trip is zero: t∗FH = 0. As a result
manufacturing firms face no competitive disadvantage in serving the larger core market H from
the smaller peripheral market F . The role of the transport sector is, therefore, quite similar to
that of an asymmetric import tariff that would protect region F .
Under full agglomeration in region H , consumer prices are given by p∗HH = a/(2b + c) and
p∗FF = (a + 2cτ)/(2b + c). The factor price and consumer surplus differentials can then be
expressed as follows:
[∆r∗]
1
= −
(b+ c)(L− 1)τ [2(a− bτ ) + cτ ]
2(2b+ c)
< 0
and
[∆S∗]
1
=
2(b+ c)2τ(a− bτ )
(2b+ c)2
> 0.
The foregoing expressions show that, on the one hand, entrepreneurs earn more if they relocate
to the smaller market F . This is because they can serve the remote region without being
harmed by competition there, whereas they are able to ship their products at zero costs to
the larger market H . Recalling that A ≡ L − 1, we see that this effect is stronger when the
local immobile demand A is large. On the other hand, since entrepreneurs are also consumers,
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they prefer to locate in the larger region H as consumer prices are lower there. Contrary to
the foregoing effect through factor rents, the consumer surplus effect does not depend on the
demand size A. Adding the factor price and the consumer surplus effects, we obtain the indirect
utility effect as follows:
[∆V ∗]
1
=
τ(b+ c)
2b+ c
[
2(b+ c)(a− bτ )
2b+ c
− (L− 1)
2(a− bτ ) + cτ
2
]
where both terms in the brackets are positive because of the trade feasibility condition. Hence,
full agglomeration is an equilibrium, if and only if [∆V ∗]1 > 0, i.e.,
A < G(τ) ≡
4 (b+ c) (a− τb)
(2b+ c) [2(a− bτ ) + cτ ]
< 4,
where G(τ) is positive and decreases with τ . In words, full agglomeration can occur only if
local immobile demand A is small enough. Because G(τ) decreases in τ , full agglomeration is
an equilibrium for all τ ∈ (0, τ trade] if A < G(τ trade). It is never an equilibrium if A > G(0).
Otherwise it is an equilibrium if τ < G−1(A). These findings may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 (fully agglomerated equilibrium) Full agglomeration in region H is a sta-
ble equilibrium for all admissible values of τ if A < 4 (b+ c)2 / [(2b+ 3c) (2b+ c)]. It is
never a stable equilibrium if A > 2 (b+ c) / (2b+ c). Otherwise it is a stable equilibrium if
τ < τ̂ ≡ 2a [2 (b+ c)− A (2b+ c)] / [2b (b+ c)− A (4b2 − c2)].
Proposition 5 shows that, in the case of full agglomeration, the traditional conclusions ob-
tained under exogenous and identical freight rates carry through to the setting with endogenous
freight rates. Indeed, even under endogenous freight rates full agglomeration is never an equi-
librium for a large enough immobile population A. This is because the positive effect of locating
in the smaller market F dominates the negative effect of higher consumer prices. Entrepreneurs
find it more profitable to locate in the smaller region so that they can serve it without being
harmed by competition, shipping their products at no competitive disadvantage to the larger
region. This competitive advantage largely compensates for the higher prices they must pay
for their consumption in the smaller region.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that when the immobile population A is small enough, there
exist multiple stable equilibria where both dispersion and full agglomeration coexist. Dispersion
occurs because the transport sector reduces agglomeration forces as entrepreneurs in the larger
region pay higher transport costs and refrain from agglomerating. Full agglomeration case
arises because the transport market is saturated in one direction so that the freight rates are
set to their maximal and minimal values irrespectively of firms’ location. The transport sector
then no longer contributes to a reduction in agglomeration forces, i.e., agglomeration becomes
profitable for entrepreneurs who are able to ship their goods at a fixed price and to consume
at lower prices.
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4.2.3 Other stable interior equilibria
Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide a detailed characterization of the interior spatial
equilibria of the model as they involve solving a higher-order polynomial equation in nH . To
make the analysis even more involved, the trade feasibility condition depends on the (inte-
rior equilibrium) spatial distribution n∗H , which depends itself on the values of tHF and tFH .
Restricting the analysis to symmetric and interior equilibria only, it is however possible to
obtain additional insights by considering numerical examples. Figure 2 plots the zero utility
differential isocurve ∆V in (τ , nH)-space for τ varying between 0 and τ
trade.20 The bold lines
correspond to stable location equilibria while dashes lines correspond to unstable equilibria.
The arrows indicate the direction of d(∆V )/dt, i.e., the relocation process that takes place
after small perturbations of the equilibrium.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
As one can see from Figure 2, full agglomeration is always an equilibrium whereas symmetric
dispersion is a stable equilibrium only for values of trade costs τ smaller than 0.15.21 In
addition, there exist asymmetric interior equilibria for τ ∈ [0.15, 0.20]. It is worth pointing out
that under endogenous freight rates one of the key results of economic geography gets reversed:
partial agglomeration decreases as trade costs fall, and in the end dispersion may prevail for
low trade costs. The reason is that dispersion makes trade costs more symmetric, thus favoring
a more balanced spatial pattern.
It is also worth pointing out that changes in freight rates with the spatial distribution of firms
are key to understanding why dispersion (resp., partial agglomeration) and full agglomeration
may coexist.22 Consider indeed the case in which firms are evenly dispersed across the two
regions. More agglomeration in region H then has several effects. First, it increases local
market size and offers consumers cheaper local access to varieties produced in H . Since at the
same time freight rates from F to H fall, imports also become cheaper. When taken together,
this consumer surplus effect constitutes a stronger agglomeration force than in the model with
exogeneous freight rates and may explain why full agglomeration can be stable for all values
of τ . At the same time, the positive consumer surplus effect is balanced by a negative rental
rate effect. Indeed, agglomeration raises freight rates from H to F , thus making access to the
foreign market more expensive. This constitutes a dispersion force that becomes dominant
when the foreign market is large enough. In particular, assume that dispersion prevails. Then
the increase in freight rates tHF , and the associated increase in the costs of serving F from H ,
20The underlying parameter values are as follows: a = b = c = 1 and A = 0.3
21Note that the existence of full agglomeration for all values of transport costs is not violating the ‘no-black-
hole condition’ because other stable equilibria coexist. The ‘no-black-hole condition’ states that the economy
fully agglomerates for all values of transport costs and that full agglomeration is the only spatial equilibrium.
22See also Behrens and Gaigne´ (2006) and Behrens et al. (2006) for a similar finding when there are exoge-
neously given density economies in transportation.
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may make a relocation from F to H unprofitable since it decreases profits and the returns to
the mobile factor. Put differently, the positive consumer surplus effect is more than offset by
the negative freight rate effect so that dispersion is a stable spatial equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
The present paper offers novel contribution about the limits of the new economic geography
paradigm (Krugman 1991). The issue of transport costs in this literature is not a new one.
A decade ago, Davis (1998) and Fujita et al. (1999) have already emphasized the important
consequences of the ‘simplifying’ assumption of zero transport costs for agricultural varieties.
Picard and Tabuchi (2008) have also discussed the role of the shape of transport cost for
manufacturing goods on the spatial distribution of the economic activity. This paper emphasizes
the important consequence of another assumption. This is about the logistic nature of transport
sector in the simple two-region model that is usually discussed. A particularity of the transport
sector is that carriers must commit to capacities and offer transport services in both directions
of trade. Because of the logistic problem of the “empties”, imbalances in the volume of trade
map into freight rate differentials that favor a more balanced distribution of economic activity.
The paper shows that the traditional agglomeration forces can be substantially dampened
by the transport firms because their freight rates endogenously respond to trade and shipment
imbalances. As a result, asymmetries in market sizes and therefore in consumption shares can
be partly or fully absorbed by freight rates. We have shown in the footloose capital model that
the home market effect is significantly attenuated by the presence of a competitive transport
sector. Furthermore, in the core-periphery model the distribution of firms can also be strongly
altered by the presence of such a transport sector. The impact of the transport sector can be
so strong that manufacturing firms may have incentives to evenly disperse under endogenous
freight rates in the same economic parameters as those for which they have incentives to ag-
glomerate under the exogenous freight rates. Such results tone down the predictions about
economic agglomeration and their corresponding policy recommendations that are presented
in the traditional new economic literature. In particular, our analysis suggests that the bad
consequences of globalization (as a fall of trade costs) on regional disparities might be over-
emphasized. In any case, the present paper opens the interesting empirical question about the
effect of freight rates on trade imbalances and firms location, a question that is left for future
research.
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Appendix A: Carriers’ profit maximization
Each carrier maximizes its profits with respect to its output:
max
Skij ,S
k
ji
Πk = tijS
k
ij + tjiS
k
ji − 2τ max
{
Skij , S
k
ji
}
.
Without loss of generality, we assume that region i has the larger demand for transport services,
which then implies that Skij ≥ S
k
ji. Two cases may arise:
1. Skij > S
k
ji.
In that case, the problem reduces to
max
Skij ,S
k
ji
Πk = (tij − 2τ)S
k
ij + tjiS
k
ji
which implies that the carrier: (i) does not offer any service from i to j when tij < 2τ ;
(ii) does provides an infinite amount of service from i to j when tij > 2τ , and an infinite
amount from j to i when tji > 0; and (iii) does provides a positive and finite market-
clearing quantity and earns zero profits when tij = 2τ and tji = 0.
2. Skij = S
k
ji.
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The first-order conditions (in vector notation) are given by(
tij
tji
)
− 2τξ = 0, where ξ ∈
{
δ
(
1
0
)
+ (1− δ)
(
0
1
)
, 0 < δ < 1
}
Put differently, tij = 2τδ > 0 and tji = 2τ(1 − δ) > 0. Note that the value of δ, which
pins down the equilibrium freight rates, will be endogeneously determined by the market
clearing conditions.
Appendix B: Stability of the symmetric core-periphery
equilibrium
B.1. Comparative statics for freight rates We can readily establish the comparative
statics of freight rates with respect to market size θi and industry location ni at the symmetric
equilibrium as follows:
∂tHF
∂nH
= −
∂tHF
∂nF
=
8(a− τb)
4b+ c
> 0,
∂tHF
∂θH
= −
∂tHF
∂θF
= 2τ −
8a
4b+ c
< 0
and
dtHF
dnH
= −
dtFH
dnH
=
2 [4(a− bτ ) + cτ ]
(4b+ c)L
> 0
B.2. Expressions for the stability of the symmetric equilibrium We give the ex-
pressions of the derivatives used to analyze the stability of the symmetric equilibrium of the
core-periphery model with endogenous freight rates. Note first that
[tFH ]1/2 = [tHF ]1/2 = τ , so that [pHH ]1/2 = [pFF ]1/2 = p =
2a+ c(τ/2)
2(2b+ c)
.
and that [
∂pHH
∂tFH
]
1/2
=
c
4(2b+ c)
> 0,
[
∂pHH
∂nH
]
1/2
= −
cτ
2(2b+ c)
< 0.
Turning next to the impacts of firms’ location on market size, we obviously have[
∂θH
∂nH
]
1/2
= 1.
Concerning the relocation incentives, we obtain the following derivatives:[
∂RH
∂pHH
]
1/2
=
(b+ c)τ
2
> 0,
[
∂RH
∂tFH
]
1/2
=
(b+ c) [4a− (4b+ c)τ ]
8(2b+ c)
> 0
and [
∂RH
∂θH
]
1/2
=
(2a− bτ )(b+ c)τ
2(2b+ c)
> 0,
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where the second inequality comes from the trade feasibility condition.
Turning finally to the consumer surplus, we obtain the following derivatives:[
∂SH
∂nH
]
1/2
=
(2a− bτ )(b+ c)τ
4(2b+ c)
> 0
[
∂SH
∂pHH
]
1/2
= −
(b+ c)(2a− bτ )
2(2b+ c)
< 0
and [
∂SH
∂tFH
]
1/2
= −
(b+ c)[4(a− bτ ) + cτ ]
16(2b+ c)
< 0.
Appendix C: Additional dispersion force
In this appendix, we show that expression (20) is always negative. First, note that (20) at
τ = 0 is given by
−
4a2(b+ c)[(b+ c)(L− 1) + bL]
(2b+ c)2(4b+ c)
< 0
Since it is a linear expression with respect to τ , it is enough to check its sign for τ = τ trade/2.
The corresponding expression is given by
a2(b+ c)2(8b2 + 16bc+ 7c2 − 8(b+ c)(2b+ c)L)
2(2b+ c)4(4b+ c)
,
which is decreasing in L. Since L > 1, and since this expression is negative for L = 1, it is
always negative. This establishes our claim.
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Figure 1:  Location equilibrium in footloose capital model. 
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Figure 2:  Location equilibria in core-periphery model. 
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